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Abstract
In their seminal paper in the ACM Transactions on Software Engi-
neering and Methodology, Zave and Jackson established a core ontol-
ogy for Requirements Engineering (RE) and used it to formulate the
“requirements problem”, thereby defining what it means to successfully
complete RE. Given that stakeholders of the system-to-be communi-
cate the information needed to perform RE, we show that Zave and
Jackson’s ontology is incomplete. It does not cover all types of basic
concerns that the stakeholders communicate. These include beliefs,
desires, intentions, and attitudes. In response, we propose a core on-
tology that covers these concerns and is grounded in sound conceptual
foundations resting on a foundational ontology. The new core ontol-
ogy for RE leads to a new formulation of the requirements problem
that extends Zave and Jackson’s formulation. We thereby establish
new standards for what minimum information should be represented
in RE languages and new criteria for determining whether RE has been
successfully completed.
∗Published at the 16th IEEE International Requirements Engineering Conference, 2008
(RE’08). Received the best paper award. This version is essentially the same as that
published by the IEEE.
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1 Introduction
A decade ago Zave and Jackson [21] observed that the field of Requirements
Engineering (RE) left behind simplistic approaches to understanding what a
system will do in favor of novel and varied terminology, methods, languages,
tools, and issues considered to be critical. They went on to define a core
ontology that establishes minimum standards for what information should
be represented in any RE language. This allowed them to formulate the
“requirements problem”, which determines exactly what it means for RE
to be successfully completed. Various representations and interpretations
of the core ontology have since been suggested and used. However, there
is limited consensus on the precise meaning of the core ontology in RE.
Rather, a requirement is variously understood as (describing) a purpose, a
need, a goal, a functionality, a constraint, a quality, a behavior, a service,
a condition, or a capability. Terms such as “nonfunctional requirement”,
“softgoal”, “preference”, “priority” only add to the confusion. It is difficult
to compare or combine contributions, and identify conceptual overlaps.
The only relevant core ontology is one which helps the software engineer
in solving the requirements problem. Zave and Jackson’s [21] provided an
elegant characterization of the requirements problem by relying on three
concepts that constitute their core ontology. A “requirement” is an optative
(i.e., desired) property of the environment, which includes the system-to-
be and its relevant surroundings. A “domain assumption” is an indicative
property, describing the environment as it is and in spite of the system-to-be.
An optative property, intended to be directly implementable and support
the satisfaction of requirements, is a fragment of a “specification”. From
there on, Zave and Jackson suggest that the requirements problem amounts
to finding the specification S that for given domain assumptions K satisfies
the given requirements R. If all three are written in a mathematical logic,
the problem is solved once the engineer finds S such that K,S ` R.
This characterization is, unfortunately, deficient. Firstly, it does not al-
low for partial fulfilment of (some) requirements, e.g., non-functional ones.
This is in sharp contrast to RE practice where it is not even clear what it
means to fully satisfy a non-functional requirement. Secondly, the charac-
terization leaves no room for one specification to be “better” than another,
given domain assumptions K and requirements R. Thirdly, important no-
tions such as those of non-functional requirement and preference (or, “nice
to have” requirements) are left out of the framework, with no substitutes to
compensate for this omission.
Our aim is to suggest a core ontology that spans much of ongoing research
in RE and is grounded in the communication between the stakeholders and
the engineer (§2–3). This allows us to provide a new formulation of the
requirements problem that responds to the above limitations (§4). We then
draw conclusions, relate to comparable discussions, and highlight important
directions for future work (§5).
2 Baseline
To select and define the concepts in our core ontology, we start from the
simple premise that stakeholders communicate information to the software
engineer in the RE process. Stakeholders include people, but also, e.g.,
legacy systems for which the documentation is available. The engineer’s
task is to classify information as requirements or otherwise (e.g., domain
assumptions), then use it in writing a specification. While this appears to
be an obvious understanding of the overall RE process, it has important
consequences on the core ontology, and is the key source of novelty with
regards to available research. Utterances that stakeholders make in com-
municating with the engineer are actions intended to advance stakeholders’
personal desires, intentions, beliefs, and attitudes, in the aim of ensuring
that the engineer can produce a specification that then leads to the system
responsive to the communicated concerns. It is important to observe here
that, if we know the various kinds of communicative actions at disposal of
the stakeholders, we can delimit the scope of the core ontology to concepts
that allow us to represent all of the communicated concerns. By looking at
the very origin of all requirements and related information, that is, the com-
munication process, our concepts are instead grounded there: they cover the
communicative actions available to the stakeholders.
We turn to speech-act theory to better understand the communication
process. There, communication is considered as action [17]: a speaker makes
an utterance in an attempt to change the state of the world. What distin-
guishes speech acts from non-speech actions is the domain of the speech
act, that is the part of the world that the speaker wishes to modify through
the act: in speech acts, this is mostly the mental state of the hearer. In
our setting, we have stakeholders as speakers, the engineer as the hearer.
Given an utterance, the engineer should distinguish its content from its il-
locutionary force in order to know to represent the content as a requirement
or otherwise. For example, when I say “Book the plane ticket” (or if I wrote
in some documentation given to the engineer), I may be expressing a de-
sire (illocutionary force) that a plane ticket be booked (content, i.e., what I
desire). Being desired, the content indicates a requirement that I hope the
system will ultimately satisfy.
Depending on the illocutionary force, the engineer will classify the con-
tent of the communication as requirements or otherwise, and thereby differ-
ently represent and act upon the communicated content: the core ontology
should include concepts that cover all kinds of illocutionary force. Depend-
ing on illocutionary force, Searle distinguishes the following kinds of speech
acts [18]: (i) assertives, which assert a proposition that the speaker believes
is true; (ii) directives, which convey a proposition that the speaker wants
to see become true; (iii) commissives stating what the speaker intends to
(do to) make a proposition true; (iv) expressives that convey a speaker’s
emotion/attitude about herself or the hearer; (v) declarations which by the
very act of being stated make a proposition true; and (vi) representative
declaratives, which recognize the truth of a proposition that has been made
true by a declaration.
Any core ontology for RE should feature a minimal set of concepts and
relationships that together can capture and distinguish between beliefs, de-
sires, intentions, and attitudes (as they are communicated by expressives).
Once we know what to cover with the core ontology, we need to produce
definitions of the concepts. To ensure an acceptable degree of rigor, we define
our concepts by mapping them to concepts defined in a restricted vocabu-
lary, namely a foundational ontology for which the underlying philosophical
choices are clear and ontological categories well-delimited and openly dis-
cussed. This makes our assumptions clearer and easier to discuss in future
efforts.
A foundational ontology is a theory about the abstract domain-independent
categories in the real world. Its main purposes are to act as a starting
point for building new ontologies and as a reference point for easy and
rigorous comparisons among ontological approaches. Among the various
available foundational ontologies (for comparisons, see [14, 4]), we choose
DOLCE [14]. DOLCE rests on intuitively attractive ontological choices for
the present discussion. In particular, DOLCE is descriptive in that it aims
to capture the ontological categories underlying natural language and hu-
man common sense. Moreover, categories in DOLCE are defined to reflect
notions that depend on human perception, cultural imprints, and social
conventions. Decisions taken over the course of RE are informed by stake-
holders having perceptual bias, individual cultural and other backgrounds,
and specific social conventions. Not recognizing such bias could hardly be an
appropriate choice at present: the resulting RE ontology would be removed
from the reality of the problem that we intend to resolve. Categories in the
ontology are therefore conceived as cognitive artifacts ultimately depending
on human perception, cultural imprints, and social conventions. DOLCE
is an ontology of particulars that distinguishes four basic categories – any
particular is either an endurant, a perdurant, a quality, or an abstract. All
proper parts of an endurant are wholly present at any time, whereas a per-
durant accumulates parts over time (only some of its parts are present at
any time). A quality is a basic perceivable and measurable entity that in-
heres to other entities (e.g., the color of this desk). It is DOLCE’s concept
of quality that we use extensively below in our core ontology for RE. In
DOLCE, qualities are basic entities that one perceives and measures. A
quality differs from the concept of “property” in that the former is a partic-
ular, while the latter is a universal. Every entity comes with some qualities.
Also, qualities can inhere in other qualities. Qualities belong to a finite set
of quality types, such as, e.g., size, color, etc. and are characteristic for –
or inhere in – specific individuals. A quality (e.g., color) is distinguished
from its “value” (e.g., some shade of red); the latter is called a “quale” and
describes the position of an individual in a certain conceptual space, that is
“quality space.” Two particulars having exactly the same color thus carry
color qualities which have the same position in the color space, or, in other
words, have the same color quale. In terms of basic ontological categories in
DOLCE, communication is a perdurant, and speech acts are sub-categories
of communication. Mental states expressed by speech acts are endurants.
More precisely, they are sub-categories of DOLCE’s notion of mental ob-
ject. In the remainder, we use DOLCE with explicit speech acts and mental
states as the foundational ontology that gives us a restricted vocabulary for
defining the core ontology for RE.
3 Core Ontology for RE
This section introduces the core ontology and explains the rationale behind
it. Facing a speech act, the engineer should first distinguish its type (i.e.,
assertive, commissive, etc.), then separate its modus (modality) from its dic-
tum (content). We have four modalities that correspond to the mental states
underlying the speech acts: belief (B), desire (D), intention (I), and attitude
(A). The engineer associates a modality to the content of a given speech
act, and then proceeds to determine if the obtained result is an instance
of a concept or relationship in our core ontology. The concepts of our core
ontology are goal, softgoal, quality constraint, plan, and domain assumption;
and the relationships are attitude-based optionality and preference, justified
approximation, and non-monotonic consequence.
Below, we first explain the association of modalities to communicated
content on the basis of speech act type (§3.1). We subsequently discuss each
concept of the core ontology. We indicate throughout the section precisely
how our ontology departs from Zave and Jackson’s.
3.1 Classifying Communicated Content
Consider the problem of designing a system for booking flights online, for
which a stakeholder suggests:
(Ex.1) No business seat has a lower price than an economy seat.
If the stakeholder believes the above is already true, the statement is an
assertive speech act. If the stakeholder intends to institute the above as a
rule, the statement is a declarative speech act. If the stakeholder merely
reiterates that the above applies, it is a representative declarative.
(Ex.2) I hope/wish/desire/expect booking to be always confirmed with
the new system.
(Ex.3) I will ensure that booking is always confirmed.
(Ex.4) It is preferred that the booking confirmation be sent quickly after
booking.
Statement Ex.2 is directive as it indicates what is desired. Ex.3 is com-
missive for it points out the stakeholders’ intention on bringing about some-
thing desired. Finally, Ex.4 is expressive, as it makes explicit stakeholder’s
attitude on how the booking confirmation is to be sent to the user. While
the illocutionary point is not apparent from written text (as in the examples
above), it is not absent [19]: when given documentation, the engineer must
determine if it expresses desires, facts, or otherwise.
Following Zave and Jackson [21], we know that the critical distinction
between a requirement and a domain assumption lies in that the former
expresses something desired, while the latter something that is already the
case, or is/will be the case regardless of the system. It is not difficult to see
that Ex.1 is thereby a domain assumption, while Ex.2 is a requirement. We
also know from Zave and Jackson that a specification together with domain
assumptions can satisfy requirements. Moreover, we know from Cohen and
Levesque [5] that an agent adopts intention X if (i) it believes X is possible,
(ii) it does not believe it will not bring about X, (iii) it believes it will bring
about X, (iv) it does not intend all the side effects of bringing about X,
and (v) it invests effort in trying to bring about X. Specification thereby
involves intentions: agents (including, e.g., stakeholders and the system-
to-be) choose how to act and commit to do so, and this in order to bring
about states of the world in which requirements are satisfied and domain
assumptions are not violated. Hence, while desires lead to requirements and
beliefs to domain assumptions, intentions lead to specifications. Ex.3 is part
of a specification.
We see therefore that Zave and Jackson’s domain assumption, require-
ment, and specification concepts cover propositional attitudes (i.e., belief,
desire, and intention) as they are usually conceptualized in philosophy [16].
More can be, and often is communicated than propositional attitudes. Look-
ing at the notion of attitude in psychology [1] (which is what expressive
speech acts convey), attitude is identified most closely with affect, i.e., a
general evaluative reaction (e.g., “I like Y” or “I like Y more than Z”). Ex.4
is an expressive as it communicates an attitude. Zave and Jackson’s core
ontology is incomplete in that attitudes are missing, which, as we show fur-
ther on, has significant consequences on the formulation of the requirements
problem.
Our approach consists first of classifying communicated content by as-
sociating modalities to it, whereby the choice of modality depends on the
kind of speech act used in communication. Rules for associating modalities
to content are:
• The content φ of an assertive or declarative or representative declara-
tive speech act that stakeholders communicated to the software engi-
neer is a belief, Bφ.
• The content φ of a directive speech act that stakeholders communi-
cated to the software engineer is a desire, Dφ.
• The content φ of a commissive speech act that stakeholders commu-
nicated to the software engineer is an intention, Iφ.
• The content φ of an expressive speech act that stakeholders commu-
nicated to the software engineer is an attitude, Aφ.
If we encounter conjunctive, disjunctive, or conditional (e.g., if [atomic
speech act 1] then [atomic speech act 2]) linking of speech acts, atomic
speech acts are separately considered when associating modalities to their
content. Observe the parallels between the above and Zave and Jackson’s
ontology: their requirement here corresponds to Dφ, while Iφ and Bφ cor-
respond to, respectively, a specification (that is, a fragment thereof) and a
domain assumption. There is no departure in this respect from the accepted
intuitions in RE: requirements cover what is desired, while domain assump-
tions concern what is true. Intentions give specification fragments for they
determine what will be done to satisfy requirements.
3.2 Domain Assumption
Beliefs communicated by way of assertive, declarative, or representative
declarative speech acts constrain the possible states of the world only to
those in which beliefs are not violated. They correspond to domain assump-
tions, which should not be violated by the sytem or its relevant surroundings,
as the following definition indicates.
Definition 1. Believed content, i.e., φ in Bφ, communicated by way of
assertive, declarative, or representative declarative speech acts is a domain
assumption, denoted generically k.
Believed content is thus considered a member of the set K of domain
assumptions that the software engineer elicits and should account for when
building a specification. K therefore contains the content of the kinds of
speech acts indicated in Definition 1.
(Ex.5) Standard credit card symbols must be displayed whenever the
customer is asked to make a payment.
If the statement above is the content of an assertive speech act, the
engineer sees it as a domain assumption. In other words, the content above
delimits possible states of the world only to those in which payment card
symbols are displayed to the customer, whenever she is asked to make a
payment. Consequently, a specification is not acceptable if it leads to states
in which the above is violated.
3.3 Goal, Quality Constraint, Softgoal
The concepts of goal and quality constraint are introduced to cover the clas-
sical taxonomic dimension for the requirement concept: the distinction be-
tween the notions of functional and nonfunctional requirement. It is widely
accepted in RE that functional requirements refer to what the system does,
as opposed to how well the system does what it does. The latter is covered
by nonfunctional requirements. Ex.6 thus gives a functional requirement.
(Ex.6) Once the payment for the flight is confirmed, book the flight.
(Ex.7) It should be possible to fully book a flight through less than 5
different screens.
Ex.7 indicates how well booking performs for it identifies a measure on
the behavior of the system (i.e., the number of different screens the user
needs to go through to book a flight). In other words, the second statement
characterizes flight booking, since it points to the existence of qualities for
which only some (sets of) possible values are desired. It follows that the
functional vs. nonfunctional distinction is grounded in the notion of qual-
ity in the sense of DOLCE. Namely, a requirement that describes qualities
and constrains quality values is a nonfunctional requirement, and that the
requirement is otherwise a functional requirement. This still remains within
accepted intuitions in RE: any functional requirement will describe what the
system does, whereas a nonfunctional requirement will refer to measures on
the system’s doings, thus allowing us to characterize how well the system be-
haves. Although uncontroversial, this separation obtains a solid foundation
herein, leading to the following definitions.
Definition 2. Desired content, i.e., φ in Dφ, communicated by way of a
directive speech act is a quality constraint, denoted q, if and only if φ
describes qualities and constrains quality values. Described qualities must
have quality space with a well-defined and shared structure.
Definition 3. Desired content, i.e., φ in Dφ, communicated by way of a
directive speech act is a goal, denoted g, if and only if φ neither describes
qualities nor constrains quality values.
It should be possible to verify whether a system satisfies requirements
before delivering it to the stakeholders. Any goal and any quality con-
straint is verifiable, in the sense that the software engineer can check at
any time whether the system satisfies the chosen goal or quality constraint.
Goals clearly are verifiable for the software engineer can determine whether
what is functionally required is indeed delivered by the system. Whether
the flight is booked whenever the payment is confirmed is not a matter of
cognitive bias or ill-defined verification criteria: the flight is either booked
or not. It is the second sentence in Definition 2 that ensures verifiability
for quality constraints: a quality constraint requires a well-defined quality
space (e.g., possible values are known, values and their relationships are
precisely defined, and so on) and the quality space must be shared among
the stakeholders.
But nonfunctional requirements are taken to include abstract consider-
ations such as security, safety, maintainability, convenience, and so on. The
question then is: How do these abstract notions relate to our quality con-
straint concept? In other words, does desiring, e.g., “high convenience in
flight booking” give us a quality constraint or something else?
Given that a quality (in our foundational ontology of choice) is a per-
ceivable and measurable entity that inheres in other entities, there must be
a quality space and values for, e.g., convenience in order to call it a quality,
and thereby state that asking for, e.g., “high convenience” is a quality con-
straint. Now, we know that people have the ability to evaluate convenience
since we observe that they can say to what extent a system is convenient. We
also know that such evaluations are not necessarily (or rarely are) shared:
while one person gives a strong favorable evaluation, another one may dis-
agree. It is reasonable to argue that any evaluation requires that a somehow
structured quality space exists. We could consequently conclude that high
convenience is a quality constraint. To do so is, however, a mistake for the
following reasons:
• Divergent evaluations of the same phenomenon mean that the struc-
ture of the underlying quality space is dependent on each individual’s
cognitive bias (i.e., the structure is subjective).
• While there seems to be some kind of quality space at each individ-
ual, people are rarely (if ever) capable of defining and/or conveying
the structure of that quality space (e.g., for convenience) in a precise
manner, so that verifiability remains elusive.
• Subjective structure of the quality space counters the need for a quality
space with a structure shared among the stakeholders, which would
subsequently facilitate verification.
To aim the verifiability of quality constraints, we require well-defined
quality spaces (e.g., as in metrics) and we need quality spaces shared among
the stakeholders, or such that the stakeholders can accept to share these in
relation to the system of interest. Qualities can take the form of measures
for which we make explicit the desired values, that is, we define quality con-
straints. Measures will have a particular level of measurement: we can have
nominal, ordinal, interval, ratio or other level of measurement [13]. There
is no restriction, e.g., on having necessarily measures that have rich sets
of permissible transformations. We conclude thus that while quality con-
straints cover some of nonfunctional requirements, abstract nonfunctional
requirements on, e.g., convenience, security, maintainability, and so on, are
not quality constraints: we call them softgoals instead.
Definition 4. Desired content, i.e., φ in Dφ, communicated by way of a
directive speech act is a softgoal, denoted qˆ, if and only if φ describes qual-
ities or constrains quality values, whereby the described qualities must have
a quality space with a subjective and/or ill-defined structure.
The following statement, communicated by way of a directive speech act
gives us a softgoal.
(Ex.8) Flight booking should be convenient.
A salient characteristic of softgoals is that they cannot be satisfied to
the ideal extent, not only because of subjectivity, but also because the ideal
level of satisfaction is beyond the resources available to (and including) the
system. It is therefore said that a softgoal is not satisfied, but satisficed.
The software engineer seeks the specification that satisfies to the highest
extent compared to the considered alternatives. This contrasts to seeking
(under resource constraints) the best among all possible alternatives, which
amounts to optimization.
But how then does one cope with softgoals? Mylopoulos and colleagues
[15] introduced so-called contribution links between goals and softgoals to
indicate that bringing about states in which the goal is satisfied contributes
positively or negatively to the satisficing of the softgoal. The aim with con-
tribution links is to enable the engineer to claim that satisfying goals in some
particular way leads to some degree of satisfaction of the softgoals. While
contribution links are attractive for they allow side-by-side comparison of
alternative system structures (e.g., [2]), their semantics remain vague, which
has led to various interpretations and use. To properly verify whether and
to what extent satisficing occurs, we need to understand more precisely how
goal, quality constraint, and softgoal are related. This is necessary in order
to show later on (§4) the role of softgoals in the requirements problem.
When the engineer aims to ensure convenience of the flight booking pro-
cess, she will try to understand how various values of measurable system
behaviors affect stakeholders’ perception of convenience. For instance, she
may consider that 6 screens for flight booking correspond to a threshold level
of convenience, and that convenience improves as the number of screens re-
duces, whereby anything less than 3 screens is unacceptable for the user is
expected to fill out too big a form over too few screens. Doing this amounts
to approximating a subjective and/or ill-defined quality space by one or
more other, well-defined and shared quality spaces. A contribution link (in
its usual interpretation – see, [15]) between quality constraints over the lat-
ter and the softgoals over the former thus indicates that the said quality
constraints approximate the degrees of satisfaction of the given softgoals.
Hence, there is correlation between the values of the quality spaces underly-
ing the quality constraints, and the values in quality spaces underlying the
softgoals, which leads us to the following definition for contribution links
within our ontology.
There are two important nuances to understand at this point. First,
classical contribution links in RE are labeled: e.g., if we choose a system
design in which there will be less than 5 screens for flight booking, we will
label the contribution link as positive (we would draw the symbol ‘+’ on
it). The label is not itself related to the sign of the correlation (e.g., the
number of screens for flight booking is negatively correlated with the ‘level’
of convenience) and there is no absolute rule for deriving one from the other.
Second, not all approximations (and thereby contributions and their labels)
are equivalently appropriate or acceptable to the stakeholders. Evidently,
the engineer cannot prove (in the formal sense) that it is indeed relevant
to approximate convenience with the number of screens in flight booking
and that the correlation is as described above; the closest feasible solution
instead is to justify that a quality referred in a quality constraint approx-
imates a quality referred in a softgoal. In other words, we are interested
in justifying that a quality constraint approximates a softgoal, whereby the
justification applies under two caveats: approximation stands for all prac-
tical purposes within the given development project, and approximation is
justified only on grounds of the information available to the software engi-
neer. New information may lead the engineer to revise the approximation
that was previously justified: e.g., more details on how stakeholders evalu-
ate convenience. The first caveat means that approximating convenience by
(among others) the number of screens for booking is justified only locally,
within the given project (it may be appropriate elsewhere, but that remains
to be justified); the second caveat means that the approximation can become
irrelevant, e.g., if the engineer finds out that stakeholders care in no way for
the number of screens, and that convenience is merely related to the length
of the form to fill when booking a flight.
Definition 5. There is a justified approximation, denoted jApprox(qˆ, q)
if and only if there is a justification for the claim “q approximates qˆ” and
there is sufficient correlation between values in the quality space of q and the
quality space of qˆ.
We speak of “sufficient” correlation, leaving the sufficient level to be
fixed case by case, and for the given project. Moreover, we do not necessar-
ily have precise correlation between a well- and an ill-defined quality space.
Still, there should be evidence that it is reasonable to believe that correla-
tion exists (e.g., based on the engineer’s previous experience or otherwise).
What justification provides is a structured process by which we can deter-
mine whether there is enough support for the claim that q approximates
qˆ. For details, the reader is referred to, e.g., Simari and Loui’s seminal
work [20] (see also [3], and for recent discussions of justification in RE, see
[10]). In conclusion to the issue mentioned earlier, to claim that softgoals
are satisficed, the engineer must identify quality constraints that justifiably
approximate these softgoals.
Compared to justified approximation, contribution links in RE do not
recognize the importance of justification and correlation between values in
the respective quality spaces. Classical contribution links are indirect when
they link goals to softgoals. It is more appropriate to speak of correla-
tion between measures over the system behaviors that satisfy goals (given
by qualities referred in quality constraints) and softgoals, than to abstract
from quality constraints, as is the case in classical contribution links. Our
ontology highlights the importance of correlation and justification for the ex-
istence of a the approximation relationship, while not rejecting the classical
contribution links. Justified approximation is one way to read contribution
links, thus ensuring more rigor in the rationale that goes in their construc-
tion.
3.4 Plan
Stakeholders and the system-to-be commit to act in the aim of satisfying
requirements and without violating the domain assumptions. Given the
content of communicated intentions, the specification will delimit the ways
in which the involved parties will bring about the desired and allowed states
of the world. We use the term plan to denote the content of communicated
intentions, and this regardless of granularity (i.e., we can have primitive and
composite plans, but this is of no interest in the present discussion).
Definition 6. Intended content, i.e., φ in Iφ, communicated by way of a
commissive speech act is a plan, denoted p.
Plans fit with the concepts introduced above as follows: the system and
the stakeholders commit to execute plans in order to satisfy goals, whereby
measures defined over plan executions act as qualities for which quality
constraints can be defined. In the usual sense of documentation describing
what the system does, a specification amounts to a definition of plans.
We are interested in plans that satisfy generic goals, such as “book a
flight”, “schedule a meeting” or “fulfill a book request”, where the goal is
instantiated at runtime for each particular flight to be booked, meeting to
be scheduled, or book that is requested. Given a vector x of parameters, we
write r(x) the goal that takes the given parameters when instantiated: e.g., x
in “Book a flight” goal may involve departure and arrival dates and locations;
when scheduling a meeting, the parameters would include the initiator, the
time of the request, the list of participants, as well as the purpose of the
meeting; for book requests, parameters would refer the author and title of
the book, also the requestor and the time of the request.
Plans ought to be defined in such a way that their proper execution
brings about states of the world in which goals verify and domain assump-
tions are not violated, all the while assuring that all quality constraints
(including those that justifiably approximate softgoals) are satisfied. We
can draw parallels here with Zave and Jackson’s formulation of the require-
ments problem. For simplicity, let us leave out attitudes (we include them
later - see §4) and recall that we would have K,S ` R according to Zave
and Jackson [21]. Given the ontology we built up to now, it is tempting to
suggest that the RE effort is successful once the engineer finds the specifica-
tion P (that includes all relevant plans p) such that K,P ` G,Q, whereby
Q includes, for all qˆ, one or more q standing in the justified approximation
relationship to qˆ (i.e., for each qˆ, we have q such that jApprox(qˆ,q)). K
includes the domain assumptions k, P carries the plans p, and G incor-
porates the goals g. The relation ` is a monotonic one, so that (i) K, P,
G, Q must define a sound and complete theory, and (ii) we accept that if
K,P ` G,Q, then, e.g., for K ⊆ K′, we still have K′,P ` G,Q; in other
words, monotonicity ensures that conclusions can never be “undone” by
new information. Evidently, we can hardly ever guarantee to have a sound
and/or complete theory for any but the smallest of toy systems, and we tend
to continually encounter in practice new information that defeats previously
valid conclusions (when, e.g., requirements are revised or domain assump-
tions change). Both K,S ` R and K,P ` G,Q are thus removed from
reality. Taking a non-monotonic consequence instead of the monotonic one
resolves this problem, for it acknowledges that sound and complete theories
are elusive for any realistic system, and that monotonicity does not apply.
Taking, for example, the defeasible consequence relation |v (as in [20]) for
non-monotonic satisfaction, we can suggest that the following conditions
ought to hold for generic goals to be satisfied and domain assumptions to
hold (for all allowed parameter values in all parameterization vectors of the
form x): (1) there are quality constraints q in Q that justifiably approximate
all softgoals qˆ in Qˆ; and (2) K,P |v G,Q.
If the above do hold, the software engineer can claim it justified to believe
that all goals and quality constraints will be satisfied if the plans that the
involved parties execute at runtime do not violate P. In other words, if the
various parties succeed in their intentions, the desired and allowed states of
the world will be reached and this while reaching values of qualities referred
to in quality constraints. Having non-monotonicity instead of monotonicity
indicates that there is no proof for this claim, merely that there is enough
evidence for accepting the given claim, and this within the information avail-
able to the stakeholders and the software engineer and within the scope of
the given development project. It is not necessary in practice for P to de-
scribe the actual plans that need to be taken: we encounter situations in
which we know how precisely one of the parties ought to act, while the best
we can do for other parties is to restrict potential ways in which they can
act; e.g., we often treat third party web services as black boxes of function-
ality, so that our plan would be written as logical constraints on the inputs
and outputs of the service.
3.5 Attitude
The content of expressive speech acts gives attitudes. Written down, an
attitude amounts to a description of an evaluation in terms of degree of
favor or disfavor [7]. Such degrees vary in sign (positive or negative) and in
intensity, whereby the intensity of the valuation is relative: considering an
object of attitude on its own involves implicit comparison to a set of objects
perceived by the evaluator to be of the same kind [11]. As Kahneman
and colleagues observe [11], “objects of attitudes [as the term is used in
psychology] include anything that people can like or dislike, wish to protect
or to harm, to acquire or to reject”. Stakeholders can thus evaluate favorably
or disfavorably, and with different intensity individual or alternative domain
constraints (Ex.9), plans (Ex.10), goals (Ex.11), quality constraints (Ex.12),
or softgoals (Ex.13).
(Ex.9) Rule in Ex.1 is unacceptable for it limits the pricing options in
case of promotions.
(Ex.10) Having the system confirm booking is preferred to having a
person do it.
(Ex.11) It would be good if the user is informed of special flight offers.
(Ex.12) It is preferred to split the flight booking form over several screens
than to show it fully one a single screen.
(Ex.13) Convenience of flight booking is more important than speed.
As the software engineer hopes to construct high quality systems, she
must be interested in attitudes: attitudes reflect stakeholders’ level of sat-
isfaction with plans, goals, domain constraints, and so on, thereby guiding
the engineer during the decision-making on whether and how to define plans
to satisfy goals, softgoals, quality constraints, and avoid violating domain
constraints. What the engineer must have in order to rate alternative spec-
ifications is therefore an explicit account of stakeholders’ attitudes.
Definition 7. Attitudinal content communicated by way of an expressive
speech act, i.e., φ in Aφ, is an attitude, denoted a, if and only if it evaluates
in terms of favor or disfavor one or more elements constituting K, P, G,
Q, or Qˆ.
It is important to understand how the introduction of attitude changes
our ontology defined up to this point. By being an evaluation over compo-
nents of K, P, G, Q, or Qˆ, any attitude a is not a concept per se, but either
(i) an evaluation of a single element in K, P, G, Q, or Qˆ, or (ii) establishes
orders between components of the same type (we do not consider in this
paper mixed orders, in which we could determine precedence between some
k and g, but only orders between different k, or between different g). The
difference between these two roles of attitudes stems from the possibility
to evaluate individually some component of either K, P, G, Q, or Qˆ (as in
Ex.9 and Ex.11), and the possibility for that evaluation to amount to a com-
parison between different components of the same type (as in Ex.10, Ex.12,
and Ex.13). We call the first role optionality and the second preference.
Optionality. Favorable or disfavorable evaluation of a single (i.e., inde-
pendently of others) k, p, g, q, or qˆ is of interest to the software engineer
to the extent that it indicates whether it is necessary to define plans that
accord with the given k, p, g, q, or qˆ. In other words, the engineer is
interested in knowing if some k, p, g, q, or qˆ is compulsory or optional.
It is compulsory if the stakeholders cannot accept a specification that does
not account for that particular k, p, g, q, or qˆ; otherwise, it is optional.
Consequently, optionality completely partitions each of K, P, G, Q, and Qˆ
onto optional and compulsory parts: K on KO and KC, G on GO and GC,
and so on. The dichotomy optional/compulsory arises from the intensity
of evaluation: favorable or disfavorable evaluation involves undoubtedly an
ill-structured and subjective evaluation space, so that the chosen dichotomy
serves to partition that space and thereby simplify the use of evaluations
over individual k, p, g, q, or qˆ. The actual intensity becomes of interest
once tradeoffs appear. It is then necessary to determine which of two or more
optional or compulsory, yet conflicting goals, plans, or otherwise, need to be
satisfied. In case of conflict, we speak of preferences and do so regardless
of optionality. Note that optionality is a means for comparing alternative
specifications, whereby those that satisfy “more” among the optional k, p,
g, q, or qˆ is more desired than another that satisfies “less” of these, all other
things being equal.
Preference. Evaluation that compares two or more instances of the same
concept in our ontology (e.g., two different goals) introduces an order be-
tween these, and amounts to what we call a preference (order). Ex.10, Ex.12,
and Ex.13 establish preference orders as each compares two alternatives in
terms of favor or disfavor. Choice of appropriate properties for the model
of the preference order (e.g., whether it is transitive) is not of interest in
this paper. It is important to note that preferences can be defined over
preferences; this is needed when all preferences cannot be simultaneously
satisfied. For instance, lower payment verification time may correlate with
lower payment security in a flight booking system. When aiming to sat-
isfy one preferred requirement negatively affects the ability to satisfy some
other requirement, we say that the involved requirement preferences are
conflicting. If the conflict cannot be alleviated through a different system
design (e.g., new payment verification servers with better performance both
in payment verification and security), the relative importance of the con-
flicting preferences should be determined. The importance relation between
requirement preferences is merely another kind of preference where higher
importance corresponds to higher desirability. The following two preference
orders over goals give a conflict:
(Ex.14) Issuing electronic flight tickets is preferred to issuing paper flight
tickets.
(Ex.15) It is preferred that all travelers have paper tickets than only those
who have had access to a printer after the booking.
We must state which of the two preferences is more desirable to follow
when choosing among alternative plans. If the preference obtained from the
second statement is more important, then a system design which satisfies
the first will be less desirable than a system design which satisfies the second
but does not satisfy the first. When we say that a preference is satisfied, we
mean that the most desirable alternative among the ordered ones is chosen.
4 Requirements Problem Revisited
Returning to Zave and Jackson’s formulation, if we seek S such that for
elicited K and R we have K,S ` R, we implicitly assume that K, S, and
R are precise and complete enough for the satisfaction relation to hold.
We have noted earlier that this is hardly a plausible assumption in practice
(§3.4), and we suggested to use a non-monotonic consequence |v instead of
a monotonic one `. This adjustment does not respond to the problem of
eliciting and using tentative evaluations: attitudes seem to be irrelevant as
they are not covered in K,P |v G,Q. They, however, clearly are relevant:
the quality of a system is evaluated by the stakeholders over the system’s
entire lifecycle, leaving the engineer to anticipate during development these
future evaluations by eliciting evaluations (i.e., attitudes) and assume that
these are representative of the future evaluations.
We have introduced two ways in which attitudes intervene within our
ontology, namely through optionality and preference. The former leads us
to partition instances of the various ontology concepts into either optional
or compulsory, whereas we will denote all preferences by A. Given some
preference order a in A stating that to satisfy some g′ is preferred to
satisfying the alternative g, all other things being equal, we prefer the spec-
ification P′, in which plans lead to states described by g′, to the specification
P in which plans lead to states described by g. We can then say that, given
A, we seek the most desirable feasible P. Following the definitions out-
lined above, the most desirable P is one that brings about the desired and
allowed states (that are delimited by requirements and domain assumptions)
that rate highest on stakeholders’ attitudes. We thus seek P that satisfies
highest ranked requirements and domain assumptions. Since we can have
preferences over conflicting preference orders, P will ideally satisfy highest
ranked alternatives that these preferences define. Attitudes that concern
the dichotomy optional/compulsory resolve a different problem with Zave
and Jackson’s formulation: if K,S ` R verifies, then all R obtains. In other
words, writing K,S ` R makes all requirements compulsory. The optional
status is impossible, even though it is clearly encountered in practice.
We can now provide the revised formulation of the requirements prob-
lem that accounts for all remarks and the ontology discussed in this paper.
Below, K denotes the finite set of all communicated domain assumptions in
a given project. Since we can have alternative domain assumptions (i.e., k is
alternative to k′ if there are no possible states in which both can hold; note
that k and k′ are inconsistent), we can partition K into a finite number of
consistent subsets Ki. Each Ki therefore contains one alternative for each
set of alternatives in K (i.e., a Ki contains either k or k′). We have the
same notational convention for P, G, Q, Qˆ, and A. The i-th consistent
subset of the compulsory domain assumptions is thus denoted KiC.
Definition 8. Starting from compulsory and optional domain assumptions
(KC and KO), goals (GC and GO), quality constraints (QC and QO), soft-
goals (QˆC and QˆO), plans (PC and PO), and attitudes (A

C and A

O) com-
municated by the stakeholders, the requirements problem amounts to finding
the specification (i.e., plans) (P∗) such that:
1. K∗,P∗ |v G∗,Q∗,A.
2. Preferences in A indicate that that there is no other combination
(KiC,G
i
C,Q
i
C) that is preferred to (K
∗
C,G
∗
C,Q
∗
C).
3. There is no Pi different from P∗ such that K∗C,P
i |v G∗C,Q∗C,AC
verifies, and
(a) K∗C,K
i
O,P
i |v G∗C,GiO,Q∗C,QiO,AC,AO verifies, where KiO is
a larger subset of KO than K∗O, and/or G
i
O is a larger subset
of GO than G∗O, and/or Q
i
O is a larger subset of QO than Q
∗
O,
and/or
(b) Preferences in A indicate that KiO is preferred to K
∗
O, and/or
GiO is preferred to G
∗
O, and/or Q
i
O is preferred to Q
∗
O.
4. For each softgoal qˆ in Qˆ, there is a quality constraint q that stands in
the justified approximation relationship with the softgoal, i.e., jApprox(qˆ, q).
5. For each preference order in A over softgoals, there is a preference
order that maintains that same same ordering over quality constraints
that stand in the justified approximation relationship to the given soft-
goals.
Note that the definition assumes (e.g., point 2 in Definition 8) that pref-
erences are combined to obtain an aggregate preference over subsets of KC,
GC, and QC. Observe that since we can define |v in an informal logic
(e.g., of argumentation [9]), the above applies if informal notation is used
during RE. The engineer no longer seeks a specification which will merely
satisfy compulsory requirements, but is expected to define a specification
which comes as close as feasible to satisfying all compulsory requirements
and as many as feasible optional requirements, and this in the way that rates
favorably as high as possible in terms of stakeholders attitudes.
5 Conclusions
Given the confusion about the basic ontology in RE, this paper revisits
the core concepts and proposes a series of definitions thereof. Definitions
are written in a restricted vocabulary of the DOLCE foundational ontol-
ogy with explicit speech acts and mental states. The scope of the core RE
ontology is now determined by the kinds of speech acts that stakeholders
communicate to the software engineer. The concepts are shown to cover
all speech acts, thereby ensuring that the software engineer can classify
all content of stakeholders’ communications as instances of concepts or re-
lationships in our ontology. In our core ontology, the concepts are goal,
softgoal, quality constraint, plan, and domain assumption; the relationships
are attitude-based optionality and preference, justified approximation, and
non-monotonic consequence.
The proposed definitions for goal, quality constraint, and softgoal con-
cepts have several advantages. Together, these concepts cover the key taxon-
omy of functional and nonfunctional requirements. In contrast to previous
work, it is clear which of the nonfunctional requirements are verifiable, and
we provided precise conditions for the verifiability of nonfunctional require-
ments. All three concepts are grounded in an intuitive foundational ontology.
It has not been particularly clear how measures fit within the goal and soft-
goal separation in RE; this issue is resolved herein. While we acknowledge,
through quality constraints, the tenet that what cannot be measured cannot
be managed, we also make it clear that not all can be directly defined or
measured: convenience, security, safety, along with considerations such as
fun amount to softgoals, which involve subjective and local quality spaces
that are difficult to precisely describe and share. Our definitions are not
specific to particular kinds of functional and nonfunctional requirements,
but span much of ongoing software engineering research on these topics. We
define the softgoal concept in a way that states precisely what a softgoal
is within the communication between the engineers and stakeholders, and
this without breaking off from the tradition of how softgoals are used in
RE (as in [15] and later). We are also in line with research on software
measurement and quality: it is indeed now well accepted that considera-
tions such as security, safety, convenience, usability, maintainability, and so
on, have no domain- and/or project-independent definition [12, 6]. Our de-
parture from Zave and Jackson lies in the introduction of attitudes and our
detailed discussion of functional and nonfunctional requirements. We shown
(§4) that Zave and Jackson’s R only includes our goals, and neither quality
constraints nor softgoals. Recently, Glinz suggested that a “nonfunctional
requirement is is an attribute of or a constraint on a system” [8], though
it remains unclear what concepts the terms ‘attribute’ and ‘constraint’ de-
note. Our conceptualization has the advantages of being grounded in the
actual context of RE (i.e., in the communication between the engineer and
the stakeholders) and we are explicit on the meaning of our concepts.
The revised ontology leads to a new formulation of the requirements
problem, that is, the fundamental problem of the RE field. We have argued
that the new formulation fits intuition better and avoids the pitfalls of the
previously established formulation from Zave and Jackson [21].
Established RE frameworks lack capabilities needed for the representa-
tion of and reasoning about instances of all terms in the terminology. It is
for instance unclear how to deal with the justification of approximation in
methodological terms, how to elicit and analyze attitudes. These are press-
ing concern. Appropriate means are necessary to resolve the requirements
problem in its revised form.
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